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Conventional cost accounting assumes that the relation between cost and volume is symmetric for volume increases 
and decreases. We test an alternative model where costs increase more when activity rises than they decrease when 
activity falls by an equivalent amount. We find, for a sample of Brazilian firms that selling, general, and 
administrative costs increase 0.59% per 1% increase in sales but decrease only 0.32% per 1% decrease in sales. We 
test several hypotheses about the properties of sticky costs and how the stickiness of SG&A costs changes with firm 
circumstances and we confirm cost stickiness for Brazilian firms. 
 
1. Introduction 
The study of cost behavior is relevant not only for academic researchers but also to those whose 
professional activities are directly related to corporate activities. In the conventional model of cost behavior 
generally accepted in the accounting literature, costs are taken as fixed or variable with respect to changes in activity 
level. In this model, variable costs vary proportionately with changes in the activity driver (Noreen, 1991), implying 
that the magnitude of a change in costs depends only on the extent of a change in the level of activity, not on the 
direction of the change. However, some authors have sustained costs rise more with increases in activity volume 
than they fall with decreases (Cooper and Kaplan, 1998, p. 247; Noreen and Sanderstrom, 1997). This kind of cost 
behavior is called by Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003) “sticky costs”. According to these authors, costs are 
sticky if the magnitude of the increase in costs associated with an increase in volume is greater than the magnitude 
of the decrease in costs associated with an equivalent decrease in volume. 
The prevalence of sticky costs is consistent with an alternative model of cost behavior in which managers 
deliberately adjust resources in response to changes in volume. This model distinguishes between costs that move 
mechanistically with changes in volume and costs that are determined by the resources committed by managers. 
When there is uncertainty about future demand and firms must incur adjustment costs to reduce or restore 
                                                            
* An earlier Portuguese-language version of this paper was presented at the 4
th USP Congress of Managerial Control 
and Accounting, held in Sao Paulo, Brazil, October 7-8, 2004.  It was awarded the title of best paper in 
Management Control and Managerial Accounting.  
§ Adjunct Professor, Department of Accounting,Universidade de Brasilia, Brazil. 
© Substitute Professor, Department of Accounting,Universidade de Brasilia, Brazil.   2 
committed resources, managers may purportedly delay reductions to committed resources until they are more certain 
about the permanence of a decline in demand. This suggests that stickiness observed in one period may reverse in a 
subsequent period and that stickiness may be less pronounced when the observation period is longer.    
The reason for this relevance consists in the fact that the basis of many managerial decisions is the 
knowledge of how costs can change as a function of activity level. Anderson, Banker e Janakiraman (2003), refers 
to Sales, general and administrative costs when it would be more correct to name them expenses. The reason for that 
is the paucity of data on costs and drivers. Similar to Anderson, Banker e Janakiraman (2003), this paper also uses 
sales, general and administrative expenses as a proxy for costs. 
As put forward by Garrison and Noreen (2001, p. 131), attempts to take decisions without the thorough 
knowledge of costs involved and of how they change relative to the activity level might lead to disaster.  
There are diverging views in the accounting literature with respect to cost behavior.  Garrison and Noreen 
(2001), Horngren, Foster and Datar (2000) sustain that costs will react or change insofar as changes on the activity 
level occur, without concern with the direction of these changes (increase or decrease). However, Noreen and 
Soderstrom (1997) and Anderson, Banker e Janakiraman (2003), state that costs vary with greater intensity with an 
increase in activity volume than in the opposite direction, i.e. with a decrease in activity volume, i.e. costs are sticky 
downwards.  
This study adopts the assumption that cost behavior depends on the intensity and direction of the variation 
in the activity driver as in Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003), who concluded that costs are sticky. The 
question we try to answer is: are the costs of Brazilian firms sticky? Sticky costs in this study mean a more intense 
(positive) cost response when revenues increase than a (negative) cost response when revenues decrease in the same 
proportion. Therefore, the paper’s main purpose is to identify how costs behave with respect to changes in net 
revenues in Brazilian firms.  
The paper is divided in six sections. In the following section, a literature review on cost behavior including 
published works on the existence of cost stickiness is presented. The third section describes the hypotheses to be 
tested in the study. The fourth section describes the methodology used. The econometric models utilized are 
presented in the fifth section and the empirical results obtained are shown in the sixth section. The seventh section 
presents the conclusions.   3 
2. Cost Behavior with respect to Activity Levels 
To understand cost behavior in response to changes in the level of production and Sales is critical for firms’ 
management virtually in all sectors (Atkinson et al., 2000; Horngren; Foster; Datar, 2000).  
Garrison and Noreen (2001, p. 131) define that cost behavior means how will cost react or change when 
changes on the activity level occur. Managers who understand how costs behave have better conditions to predict 
what will be the trajectory of costs in several operating situations, allowing them to better plan their activities and, 
consequently, earnings. Suppose, for example, the following questions: 
What is the effect of eliminating a product line on operating profits? Is it better to produce or purchase? 
Which prices must be raised? Which effect will an increase of 10% on sales have on operating profit? Theses and 
many other managerial decisions depend upon the knowledge of cost behavior.  
The semi-variable cost is composed of a fixed part (the activity costs when the volume of services is equal 
to zero) and a variable part (which must vary according to the activity driver). The semi-variable or mixed costs (for 
example, wages of maintenance workers) remain constant within large activity ranges and increases or decreases in 
response to reasonably large changes on the activity level only. Small changes in the production level might not 
affect for example the number of employees required to adequately handle maintenance.  
Fixed costs can be considered as committed or discretionary (Garrison and Noreen, 2001). Committed fixed 
costs are by nature long run and cannot be reduced to zero even for short periods. Depreciation of fixed assets, 
property tax, salaries of management and operating personnel are examples of committed fixed costs. Discretionary 
fixed costs are generally short-run costs and can be cut for short periods, with minimum damage for the 
organizations’ long run targets. Examples of discretionary fixed costs are advertising, research, and public relations. 
Some managerial accounting experts argue that costs are neither genuinely variable nor fixed (Ingram, 
Albright and Hill, 1997) and that the relationship between variable and fixed costs and the activity level is valid 
within the so-called “relevant range” (Horngren, Foster and Datar, 2000; Maher, 2001).  
The relevant range is the activity range in which the cost behavior hypotheses assumed by the manager is 
valid. Despite the emphasis given by economists to the non-linearity of many variable costs, it is assumed that a 
non-linear cost can be approximated by a straight line, within the activity range (Garrison and Noreen, 2001).  
Innes and Mitchell (1993, p. 86) consider that the accounting literature has a myopic view on how costs 
behave. Generally cost behavior is analyzed and measured by one driver only – production level. They add that 
classifying indirect costs as fixed (costs which do not change with changes in volume) might lead to wrong   4 
decisions insofar as in many organizations these costs have shown high growth rates without an increase in activity 
volume (Miller and Vollmann, 1985; Berliner and Brimson, 1992). The basis for this argument comes from the 
activity based costing (ABC) assumption that costs are primarily influenced by the volume of each activity flow, 
rather than by the volume of production (Innes and Mitchell, 1993). Hence, the efficacy of the cost-driver 
information is in providing a series of factors which might be used to explain fixed cost behavior (Innes and 
Mitchell, 1993). For the activity based costing a linear relationship between cost drivers and costs exists (Kaplan 
and Cooper, 1998).  
Noreen (1991) demonstrates that cost allocation – even in ABC – is relevant for the decisions if, and only 
if, the following conditions are satisfied: 1) all costs can be divided in centers and each one is defined as a function 
of a measured activity; 2) the cost amount in each cost center changes in direct proportion to its activity; and 3) all 
activities can be attributed to products in the sense that if a product is cut, then the activities associated to this 
product will be eliminated. Noreen and Soderstrom (1994) tested the second condition: that the costs are strictly 
proportional to the activity. This hypothesis was rejected in the majority of indirect cost accounts in hospitals in the 
US.  
Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003) tested and confirmed the hypothesis that costs are sticky. By 
specifying a model with SG&A costs as a function of net sales revenues, they found that costs increase on average 
0.55% in response to a 1% increase on net sales revenues, but decreases by only 0.35% with respect to a 1% 
reduction on those revenues. Due to the lack of general data on costs and relevant drivers, data on SG&A costs and 
net sales revenues have been used to analyze cost stickiness. SG&A cost behavior can be analyzed with respect to 
net sales revenue because sales volume drives many of the SG&A components (Kaplan; Cooper, 1998; Noreen; 
Soderstrom, 1994).  
According to Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003), there are various reasons for cost stickiness, such 
as: natural reluctance in firing employees when the activity volume decreases, agency costs, and the need of time to 
confirm the tendency of activity volume reduction. Managerial decisions to maintain unutilized resources can also 
be caused by personal considerations and result in agency costs. Agency costs are incurred by the firm because of 
decisions taken by managers based on the maximization of their own interests and not under the perspective of 
creating value for the firms’ shareholders (Anderson; Banker; Janakiraman, 2003)
1. 
Knowledge about cost behavior is important for accountants, researchers and other professionals related to 
the management field that assess the changes in costs with respect to changes in revenues. The managerial inference 
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from the analysis is that cost stickiness can be recognized and controlled. Managers must assess their exposition to 
cost stickiness by considering the sensitivity of cost changes relative to volume reductions, increasing the firms’ 
response capacity vis-à-vis reductions in the demand for products or services. This may contribute to improve the 
accountability process. By and large, this expression means the obligation of the agent or representative – either 
private or governmental – to give account to the principal or represented. By verifying cost stickiness, firm owners 
can analyze if managers are incurring in agency costs. 
Understanding cost behavior is also relevant for external users (financial analysts, for example) who want 
to assess the firm’s performance. The common procedure of financial analysts involves the comparison of SG&A 
components as a percentage of net sales revenues across firms or within the same firm through time. This analysis 
may be incorrect if cost behavior relative to decreases or increases in revenues is not observed and this can be 
improved when analysts understand how costs change with respect to revenues. 
3. Hypotheses 
In connection with the asymmetric cost behavior four hypotheses are tested in this study, as follows: 
H1: the magnitude of a cost increase as a function of an increase in net sales revenues is greater than the 
magnitude of a cost reduction as a function of an equivalent reduction in net sales revenues. 
Hypothesis H1 considers how the managerial intervention affects the process of resource adjustment. 
Managers make discrete changes in committed resources because some corresponding costs cannot be added or 
reduced fast enough to combine changes in resources with small changes in demand. 
Firms have to incur in adjustment costs to remove committed resources and to replenish these resources 
when demand is reestablished. Adjustment costs include, for example, expenses with dismissing employees and 
hiring new ones, as well as organizational costs deriving from reduction motivation of the remaining employees 
after the dismissing of many professionals. 
When demand rises, managers raise committed resources in order to match the additional demand. When 
demand declines, however, some committed resources will not be totally utilized, unless managers take the 
deliberate decision to cut them. In order to do this, it is necessary that managers assess the probability that this 
demand decline is temporary, when the time is come to decide upon the reduction of committed resources. Sticky 
cost behavior will occur if the manager decides to keep unnecessary resources instead of incurring in adjustment 
costs when volume declines.   6 
Managerial decisions of holding unnecessary resources can also be caused by personal interests, resulting 
in agency costs. Managers may keep idle resources in order to avoid personal consequences of cost reductions, such 
as loss of status when a branch is restructured or the anguish of firing familiar employees, contributing to cost 
stickiness. Brealey, Myers and Marcus (1998) consider the understanding of the Agency Theory as one of the main 
foundations of financial management. 
Observing cost stickiness in one time period only reflects the costs of maintaining unused resources in a 
period when a revenue decline occurred. When the observation window includes several time periods, more 
complete adjustment cycles are captured. During longer time intervals, the managerial assessment about the 
permanence of a change in revenues becomes more precise and then adjustment costs become lower relative to the 
cost of keeping unused resources. Therefore, it is likely that cost stickiness is less pronounced when time periods are 
aggregated into two, three or four-year periods, instead of one-year periods. Besides, the cost adjustment to revenue 
changes can occur not only contemporaneously but also in a lagged way, i.e. cost stickiness might be lower if its 
behavior is observed including one lagged period. In order to test these two possibilities, hypothesis H2 and H3 were 
specified as follows: 
H2: Cost stickiness decline with the aggregation of periods. 
H3: There is a lagged adjustment of costs relative to revenue changes. 
Changes in sales revenues can reflect short-term market conditions or structural shifts in demand for 
products and services. Managers, when observing a sales drop can wait for information which will allow them to 
assess the permanence of the demand fall before taking decisions on cutting resources. Such delays provoke cost 
stickiness, since unused resources are kept during the period between the reduction in volume and the adjustment 
decision. A time interval between the decision of cutting resources and the effective cost reduction can also occur, 
since contractual commitments take time to be undone. A consequence of the delay in taking decisions and undoing 
contractual arrangements is that the asymmetric change observed in one time period might be reverted in subsequent 
periods. In order to test this possibility, hypothesis H4 was established.
 
H4: Cost stickiness is reverted in subsequent periods.  
Section 4 presents the methodology and the data utilized to test the four hypotheses described. 
4. Methods 
This paper employs panel data log-linear regressions to test cost stickiness. Three panel-data models were 
used in order to ensure the robustness of results: constant coefficients or pooled-regression model, fixed effects   7 
model and random effects model (Greene 2003, p. 285-287). The constant coefficients model assumes that both the 
intercept and the slope do not vary, being the same for all firms. The individual fixed effects model assumes that the 
slopes are fixed but the intercepts are different for each firm. In this case, there are no time effects affecting the 
regression, but individual effects only. These effects can be observed or not observed and they are generally 
correlated to the regressors, i.e., they are endogenous. The random effects model assumes that, if there are effects 
not belonging to the model, these are exogenous and uncorrelated to the regressors (Baltagi, 2001, p. 20).  
In order to further assure the robustness of the empirical study, individual time-series regressions were 
carried out for Model I. Results are shown in section 5. 
4 4. .1 1. .    P Pa an ne el l   U Un ni it t   R Ro oo ot t   T Te es st ts s   
According to econometric literature, data series must prove to be stationary in order to avoid otherwise 
spurious regressions (Greene, 2002, p. 631). This means that all series must be free from unit roots. One possible 
approach when dealing with panel data is to test each one of the series for unit roots. However, several panel unit 
root tests have been recently developed to deal with panel data. Recent literature suggests that panel-based unit root 
tests have higher power than unit root tests based on individual time series. In this study, we computed the following 
five types of panel unit root tests: Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Breitung (2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Fisher-
type tests using ADF and PP tests (Maddala and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001). The tests were applied to the Model II 
only, since Model I is nested in it, which means that if there is no evidence of unit roots in Model II, than there will 
be no evidence of unit roots in Model I either. The results of these tests are given in Table 1, in section 5. 
4 4. .2 2. .    M Mo od de el ls s   
Model I is utilized to asses how costs react to net sales movements and to discriminate the periods when 
revenues increases or decreases. Its specification is: 
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Because of the great diversity of firms in terms of performance and size, the log-linear specification 
provides a better comparativeness of variables among firms and alleviates potential cross-section heterocedasticity. 
The dummy variable is equal to one when the revenue of the i-th firm in time t is lower that revenue in time t-1. 
Since the dummy is equal to zero when revenue increases, coefficient 
￿
1 measures the percentage rise in costs with 





2) measures the percent fall in costs with respect to a 1% drop in revenue. If costs are sticky, cost   8 
change relative to an increase in revenue must be greater than the change relative do a revenue drop. Therefore, 
hypothesis H1 for stickiness implies that 
￿ 1 > 0 and 
￿ 2 < 0. On the other hand, if the conventional model of fixed and 
variable costs is valid, the cost changes (reduction or increases) will be symmetric and hence 
￿ 2 = 0. Besides, if 
fixed costs exist, 
￿ 1 < 1, meaning economies of scale (Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman, 2003). 
 In order to test hypothesis H2 that cost stickiness decreases with the aggregation of years per period, 
regressions were carried out with Model I for aggregate periods of 1, 2, 3, and 4 years. 
In order to test hypotheses H3
 and H4, Model I was extended to include an additional variable designed to 
capture the one-year lagged effect of changes in sales revenue on cost changes becoming Model II:  
&
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                  (II). 
The table below summarizes what is expected of the model’s coefficients in order to validate the 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis  Condition for acceptance 
H1  b1 > 0, b2 < 0, b1 + b2 < 1 
H2  b2 decreases in absolute value with aggregation of years per period. 
H3  b3 > 0 
H4  b4  > 0, b4 < |b2| 
The panel-data estimation results for Models I and II are shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4, in section 5. 
4 4. .3 3. .    D Da at ta a   d de es sc cr ri ip pt ti io on n   
Annual data for SG&A costs and net sales revenues of Brazilian publicly listed firms reported by 
Economatica
® for the 1986 through 2003 period were utilized. All data were adjusted for inflation using the 
Brazilian General Price Index (IGP-DI). From the original 542 firms, those belonging to the Financial, Insurance, 
and Pension Funds sectors were excluded, together those with no net revenues reported in more than eight years. 
The resulting sample is composed by 198 Brazilian firms.  
5. Results 
Results of the unit root tests mentioned in section 4.1 are shown in Table 1.  
   9 
Table 1: Panel unit root tests 
Method  Statistic  Prob.** 
Cross-
sections  Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  -409.357   0.0000  765  10291 
Breitung t-stat  -31.2377   0.0000  765   9526 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   -78.9139   0.0000   765   10291 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  6478.54   0.0000  765  10291 
PP - Fisher Chi-square   9160.91   0.0000   770  10823 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
It can be seen that results reported in Table 1 show that the null of a unit root is strongly rejected in all tests 
employed, according to the statistics and p-values obtained. 
The empirical tests carried out in this study in connection with the specified models are presented in this 
section, together with those obtained by Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003), for comparison. 
Table 2 shows, side by side, the results obtained by panel data pooled regression reported in Anderson, 
Banker and Janakiraman (2003) and the corresponding ones obtained in the present study, for models I and II. 
Model I was estimated for one year periods and for aggregate periods of 2, 3 and 4 years, whereas model II was 
estimated for one-year periods only. Besides the coefficient values and their t statistics (between brackets), F 
statistics, adjusted R
2, Durbin-Watson statistics and the number of observations are reported. 
Table 2: Panel data regressions with common coefficients 
Coefficient Estimates 
(t statistics) 
Model I  Model II 
One-year periods  Two-year periods  Three-year periods  Four-year periods   One-year periods 
 
AB&J  Current  AB&J  Current  AB&J  Current  AB&J  Current  AB&J  Current 
￿
0  0.048 
(39.88) 
















-0.008    
(-1.03) 
￿





















2  -0.191    
(-26.14) 
-0.269    
(-10.99) 
-0.156    
(-13.40) 
-0.388   
 (-14.85) 
-0.091    
(-5.56) 
-0.396    
(-15.81) 
-0.034   
(-1.76) 
-0.501       
(-19.51) 
-0.187     
(-23.47) 
-0.363   
 (-12.64) 
￿
3                                                                                                                                                                                                       0.103 
(29.79) 
-0.032     
(-1.72) 
￿








￿ 2  0.354  0.324  0.525  0.277  0.623  0.270  0.708  0.240  0.345  0.283 
F  -  921.68  -  891.84  -  942.15  -  975.55  -  430.59 
R
2   0.3663  0.4238  0.5349  0.4330  0.6513  0.4638  0.6513  0.5097  0.6513  0.4262 
 
Analyzing the results reported in Table 2, it can be seen that our coefficient b1 is higher to that reported by 
Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003), both in value and sign. This is true both for Models I and II,   10 
independently of the number of years per period. This coefficient measures the cost elasticity with respect to 
revenues. For one-year periods, the significant value of 0.593 obtained for b1 indicates that costs increased by 
0.593% in response to an increase of 1% in revenues. Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003) found 0.545%. The 
estimated value de b2 = -0.269 provides strong support to hypothesis H1 of cost stickiness. The combined value b1 + 
b2 = 0.324 shows that costs fell by 0.32% in response to a 1% drop in revenues. The fact that both b1 and b1 + b2 are 
significantly smaller than 1 show that cost changes are not proportional to revenue changes, despite the relevance of 
this cost driver. With this result, the cost stickiness hypothesis H1, accepted in Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman 
(2003), is also accepted in our study. Comparing b1 + b2 from our study with those of Anderson, Banker and 
Janakiraman (2003), we can see that this coefficients’ sum is always lower for Brazilian relative to American firms, 
and that the difference increases as the number of years per period increases. This is an indication that firms’ cost 
stickiness is higher in Brazil relative to the US. 
It can also be seen from Table 2 that hypothesis H2 that cost stickiness falls with the aggregation of years 
per period, which is accepted in Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003), is rejected for Model I in our study with 
common intercept. In that study, b2 in Model I decreases in absolute value as the number of years per period 
increases, whereas in our study b2 increases in absolute value, showing the cost stickiness gets worse as aggregation 
of years per period increases. 
Model II, which includes revenue changes lagged by one period, was used to test hypothesis H3 that cost 
stickiness is reversed in subsequent periods. In our estimation of Model II with common intercept (pooled 
regression), we found b1 = 0.646 [against b1 = 0.532 in Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003)], which is 
somewhat higher than that obtained for Model I. Coefficient b2 = - 0.363 [against b2 = - 0.187 in Anderson, Banker 
and Janakiraman (2003)], confirms cost stickiness in Model II. However, in Model II b3 is not significant, which 
leads to the rejection of H3, contradicting Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003), who found a significant b3 = 
0.103. A significant and positive b4 = 0.216 confirms the partial reversion of cost stickiness in the period subsequent 
to a revenue drop, since b4 < |b2|, which leads to accepting H4. Therefore, whereas in Anderson, Banker and 
Janakiraman (2003) all four hypotheses were accepted, in our study H1 and H4 were accepted, but H2 and H3 were 
rejected, as far as a common-intercept panel-data estimates are concerned. 
Models I and II were also estimated by panel data with fixed effects and random effects, in order to check 
the robustness of the results reported so far. Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that the fixed and random effects 
regressions, respectively, confirm the results of Table 2. Although the values of the estimated coefficients are   11 
slightly different from those of Table 2, the magnitudes and signs lead to the same conclusions. The fixed effects 
and random effects regressions yield significant b1 and b2, with b1 > 0 and b2 < 0, which means that b1 + b2 < b1, i.e. 
costs are sticky. Here too, b3 is not significant, which does not confirm the lagged adjustment of costs, i.e. H3 is 
rejected. Coefficient b4 is significant and b4 < |b2|, which confirms the partial reversion of stickiness in subsequent 
periods. The results also show that stickiness increases with the aggregation of years per period, which contradicts 
H2. 





One-year periods  Two-year periods  Three-year periods  Four-year periods 
Model II  
One-year periods 
￿
1  0.589                 
(29.77) 
0.654                
(29.89) 
0.653               
(30.87) 
0.745           
(32.78) 
0.647      
(28.67) 
￿
2  -0.306                      
(-11.08) 
-0.433                        
(-15.47) 
-0.436                     
(-16.27) 





3          -0.029 
(-1.50) 
￿
4          0.204 
(6.48) 
F  11.05  12.38  13.75  15.03  10.09 
R
2   0.4227  0.4676  0.5119  0.569  0.4062 
 









0  -0.019                      
(-1.81) 
-0.026                       
(-3.04) 
-0.024                      
(-3.24) 
-0.032                    
(-6.08) 
-0.008          
(-1.01) 
￿
1  0.584              
(32.14) 
0.653                
(31.48) 
0.659              
(32.72) 





2  -0.267                     
(-10.95) 
-0.388                       
(-14.98) 
-0.397                      
(-15.93) 





3          -0.032 
(-1.74) 
￿
4          0.217 
(7.46) 
R
2   0.4138  0.4166  0.4543  0.5024  0.4262 
 
As mentioned earlier, in order to further assure the robustness of the empirical study, individual time-series 
regressions were carried out for Model I. We removed anomalous results such as b1 > 1 and b2 > 0, which make no 
sense in any cost accounting theory. The average values for b1 and b2 are shown in Table 5, together with those 
reported by Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003). It can be seen that when revenues move upwards, cost 
response is very similar for Brazilian (b1 = 0.7212) and American firms (b1 = 0.7156). However, when revenues   12 
move downwards, cost response is significantly lower for Brazilian firms (b1+b2 = 0.2322) relative to American 
firms (b1+b2 = 0.4753). This indicates that cost stickiness in Brazilian firms is significantly more intense than in 
American firms.   
Table 5 – Time-series estimates for Model I 
  Current  AB&J 








b1+b2  0.2322  0.4753 
Figures between brackets are standard deviations 
6. Conclusion 
The evidence documented in our study confirms partially the results by Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman 
(2003) that the behavior of costs with respect to revenue changes is sticky. Hypothesis H1 of cost stickiness with 
respect to revenue changes is wholly confirmed for Brazilian firms. Hypothesis H2 that cost stickiness diminish 
when we consider longer periods, i.e. with the aggregation of years per period is not confirmed. Hypothesis H3 of 
lagged adjustment of costs in response to revenue reductions is not verified. However, hypothesis H4 of partial 
reversion of stickiness in subsequent periods is confirmed. It was also shown that cost stickiness in Brazilian firms is 
significantly more intense than in American firms. 
A possible inference from the rejection of H2 and H3 in our study, as well as for the apparently higher 
degree of cost stickiness in Brazilian firms is that Brazilian managers are more lenient towards the necessity to 
further reduce costs after a period of revenue drops, and to proceeding to the adjustment of resources in a longer 
term, with respect to managers of American firms. Several explanations can be put forward for this. First, Brazilian 
managers are possibly less inclined to fire workers when revenue drops because of the persistent social problems in 
Brazil, with high unemployment rates, poverty, and so on. Second, skilled workers are not abundant in the Brazilian 
labor market, and the usually firms have to train their own personnel if they need skillful manpower. Third, perhaps 
as an emerging country, Brazil has not reached yet the status of full-fledged capitalism. Finally, since the Brazilian 
economy is more unstable than the developed ones, it is possible that Brazilian managers fell more difficult to 
reckon if a revenue drop is a slump or it is only a short-term fluctuation. 
In opposition to the model conventional of fixed and variable costs, our results, although not confirming 
completely those of Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003), are consistent with an model alternative of cost 
behavior that takes into account the role of managers in adjusting resources in response to demand fluctuations. This   13 
brings important implications for accountants, financial analysts and other professionals who assess cost changes 
with respect to revenue variations. 
The traditional approach to cost behavior recommends methods such as regression analysis to estimate the 
average cost change associated to a unit change in the activity driver. Performing such estimations with no 
consideration to cost stickiness, leads to underestimation of cost responses when activity rises and to overestimation 
of cost responses when activity falls.  
A managerial inference of the analysis is that cost stickiness can be verified and controlled. Managers can 
assess their exposition to sticky costs when observing the cost sensitivity to volume reductions. They can increase 
the costs sensitivity to volume fluctuations by taking contractual decisions which reduce the adjustment costs 
connected to change the levels of committed resources.  
The empirical models tested in this paper provide a basis for additional research on the causes and 
consequences of sticky cost behavior in Brazilian firms. Evidence was provided that sticky cost behavior is 
consistent with deliberate decisions by managers who weight the economic consequences of their actions. To 
acquire a deeper understanding of the managerial decision processes and the factors leading to sticky cost behavior 
is an important step forward to improve cost accounting in Brazil. 
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